

A quarterly report of MABAS WISCONSIN activities to underscore its value to the community and to foster growth and improvement through the sharing of actual experience

## ACTIVE SHOOTER SCENARIOS BY GARY SCHMIDT

In the Summer 2012 issue of this newsletter, there was an article that listed a sampling of the MABAS training exercises performed by Fire Departments throughout the State (see *MABAS: A Key Partner In Protecting The Homeland*). A recurring type was the *Active Shooter* scenario.

Unfortunately, that scenario struck twice in Southeast Wisconsin in the summer

and fall of 2012, leaving eleven dead and seven others shot, including a Police Lieutenant who survived after he was shot 12 times with 3 additional rounds embedded in his protective vest.

Inside this issue, the Fire Chiefs of Oak Creek (Div 107 Milwaukee County) and Brookfield (Div 106 Waukesha County) provide their perspective of the two incidents.



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## PRESIDENT'S CORNER BY ED JANKE

MABAS Wisconsin continues to grow; we are currently at 47 divisions. Statewide mutual aid agreements through MABAS now incorporate over 90% of the population of the State and approximately 75% of the fire departments are connected in mutual aid agreements.

Given some of the major events that we have had in the past few months, I find it interesting that those involved in MABAS Wisconsin remark about how effective the system works, in that the system acts as an insurance policy of sorts; a system that insures the type and kind of resource required will be available upon request.

There are several counties working on division status in our various regions. The regional coordinators and the executive board members have done an extraordinary job with assisting in the development of the MABAS system.

In this issue of "*MABAS-Wisconsin in Action*," we review two active shooter events that have occurred in Wisconsin. Both the Sikh Temple incident and the Azana Spa incident clearly indicate that Wisconsin is not immune from this type of violence.

The first formally acknowledged "active shooter" incident involved Charles

Whitman, who on Aug. 1, 1966, opened fire from the clock tower at the University of Texas in Austin, killing 16 people and wounding 31. As we move forward in time there have been a number of shootings, in particular the Columbine shooting which caused first responders to re-think and re-define response policies to these events. The once popular "contain and callout" is no longer a viable option for first responders.

Mass shootings usually fall into three distinct categories: rampage killers, workplace killers, and school shooters. All three categories can be classified as active shooters. The rampage killer is a spree killer who notably has usually shown no previous inclination to violence, but kills in a sudden frenzy. Workplace killers have occurred across the country as well as the much publicized school shooters.

According to a review by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) statistics, 46 percent of active shooter incidents are ended by the application of force by police or security, 40 percent end in the shooter's suicide, 14 percent of the time the shooter surrenders and in less than 1 percent of those cases, the violence ends with the attacker fleeing.

As we review the recent occurrences in Wisconsin, consider that FBI statistics indicate offenders are typically single shooters (98 percent), primarily male (97 percent). In 40 percent of the instances the shooters kill themselves. Two percent of the shooters bring IEDs as an additional weapon. In 10 percent of the cases, the shooter stops and walks away. In 20 percent of the cases, the shooter goes mobile, moving to another location. Forty-three percent of the time, the crime is over before police arrive. In 57 percent of these cases, an officer arrives while the shooting is still underway. The  
*(Continued on page 2)*



MABAS Technical Rescue Box (see page 9)  
*(Photo by Michael Gouvion/Milton Courier)*

## PRESIDENT'S CORNER - CONTINUED

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shooter often stops as soon as he hears or sees law enforcement, sometimes turning his anger or aggression on first responders who present targets of opportunity.

Very importantly, 75 percent of these incidents will be stopped by law enforcement personnel actively engaging the perpetrator(s). One-third of the officers will be shot as they engage the suspects. Active-shooter incidents often occur in small and medium sized communities where police departments are limited by budget constraints and staffing. The average active-shooter incident lasts 12 minutes.

Given the unpredictability of these behaviors in target rich environments

where the suspects usually plan for a final showdown in which their only mission is to inflict as many casualties as can be amassed, there are clear implications for the fire service. These articles detailing the recent active shooter events in Wisconsin are likely to invoke much discussion in our fire ranks.

How will we interface with law enforcement in the "hot zone" during an MCI event for patient triage and care? How do we unify command and maintain accountability in such a fast moving perhaps spread out, chaotic scene that may not yet be contained? How do we preserve crime scenes and victim evidence with the potential for numerous traumatic injuries requiring immediate care? How do we plan

and adequately resource before during and after these events. What type of training do we need to be safe and effective? Please consider these questions and the discussions we should have with our law enforcement partners.

In closing, MABAS Wisconsin is looking for best practices and input as we consider the roles of our Regional Coordinators and Incident Management Teams to assist in these "active shooter" situations. Please contact Keith Tveit at [keith.tveit@wisconsin.gov](mailto:keith.tveit@wisconsin.gov) with thoughts or ideas regarding training in this area for the fire service. MABAS Wisconsin is committed to an active role in ensuring that resources are available and ready - "neighbor helping neighbor."

## MABAS DIVISIONS 112 & 128 IN ACTION - 5 ALARM GREEN BAY APARTMENT FIRE BY DREW SPIELMAN

On Thursday May 23, 2013, **Green Bay Metro Fire** was dispatched to 3415 Hilltop Way, in the Village of



Allouez, for the report of smoke coming from the basement laundry room. En-route crews were advised of multiple calls and the reports of persons unable to exit due to smoke conditions.

Upon arrival companies found light smoke on the exterior and moderate smoke conditions on the inside. Crews advanced into the basement to attempt extinguishment. Heavy

smoke and heat conditions were found in the basement and the fire appeared to be traveling into the void spaces. With little headway being made crews attempted to cut the floors out of several apartments to try and access the fire in the basement. Conditions deteriorated rapidly and crews were ordered out of the building so a broad size up could be made. At this point the fire had traveled up to the attic space and started to spread. Crews made several attempts to get ahead of the fire and cut it off by trench cutting the first floor and pulling ceilings on the second floor. Each time they tried the fire had already advanced past them. It was then decided to go to a full defensive attack.

Due to the size and complexity of the structure MABAS Card 4-11 was eventually upgraded to the 5th Alarm. Crews initially had some water issues until engines could be placed inline to relay pump. With numerous ladder



pipes and towers operating, the Village of Allouez water system was starting to deplete. It was determined it could no longer keep up and a tender shuttle was started. MABAS Card 4-12 to the 5th Alarm was called to supply water. Two inter-divisional strike teams were also requested for Engines and Tenders from Div 128.



(Photos by Drew Spielman. These photos and others are located at <http://secondalarmimages.smugmug.com> )

## ACTIVE SHOOTER IN OAK CREEK BY TOM ROSANDICH, CHIEF, OAK CREEK FIRE DEPARTMENT

**Size-up and response.** The initial response was an engine, an ALS transport (paramedic) unit, and a Battalion Chief (BC), to stage, until called by PD. Nine minutes later, with reports of possibly multiple victims, the BC requested 2 additional ALS and 2 BLS (ambulance) transport units. Within the first 15 minutes, the Oak Creek Command Post was called for and a MABAS Life Safety Box was requested.

There were rumors that as many as 20 were injured inside the building and there was possibly more than one shooter (editor's note: many called from inside to multiple friend's or relative's homes and those people called 911 with varying descriptions, making it difficult to determine if the

calls were reporting the same victims and shooter or not). There also was the logistics of having a major airport one mile away and the need for medical and law enforcement helicopters in the same airspace.

**Communication.** We went from our local (frequency) to IFERN to Red and Blue. Also we were in contact with Paramedic Base (at Milwaukee's Level I Trauma Center) for the EMS side of triage and transport. We had to send liaisons to several police agencies to stay on top of their intelligence. I was in direct communication with the Mayor and top city personnel for not only the incident but the remaining week for all the tributes and funeral. We had a Battalion Chief at dispatch coordinating information from around

the world and assisting them in helping our side of the equation. Also, emergency management was involved with establishing a non emergency line for information.

**Reality vs. training.** It was a dynamic scene and, as was seen in Boston, not one size fits all. There are similarities and there will be more information in a formal sense on active shooter incidents in the future. Keep in mind expect the unexpected. Safety and Accountability is key. Also, much like a fire when can you go offensive and when do you have to be defensive, it can be a fine line and may end up being a combination of both during an active shooter scenario. We utilized our two Oak Creek members trained in tactical EMS (TEMS). Along with 2 TEMS from Milwaukee Fire, there were 4 FD personnel inside (the hot zone) and that provided another set of communications via cell phone (by FD personnel).

**Future training.** We have a training set for a joint police and fire shooter event for this fall. Coordinating and terminology will be looked at as well as understanding each other's place at the scene. As far as MABAS use, every year we review the cards and look at the lessons learned and improve on the cards and communications across all types of events. We did learn that staging needs to be considered for rehab due to the potential for sitting there a long time. Operational periods and IMT's were also discussed in this process.

**Comparison to Previous Incident.** *(On November 5, 2004, 2 people were shot, 2 others killed, during a stand-off at the Comfort Suites Hotel at 6362 South 13<sup>th</sup> Street in Oak Creek, prior to Div 107 becoming*

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## SIKH TEMPLE ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENT

### Scene:

Large 2-Story freestanding Temple with many rooms for cooking, dining, & living quarters

Isolated and set back several hundred feet from major roadway

Area businesses in vicinity closed (Sunday morning)

Weather Conditions: Sunny (8/5/12) around 10:30am temp in high 70's

### Summary:

Report of multiple people shot in the building and outside

Report of victim at house one block away

Report of smoke inside – possible food burning unattended on stoves

Report of possible natural gas leak

Report of people hiding/trapped inside the building, including children

Language barriers with callers

Second-hand and third-hand calls continuing for extended period of time

Unknown if additional shooters

Shooter(s) not known to victims

Staging across the street in bowling alley parking lot

Dozens of relatives and friends coming to scene

Tremendous influx of media

Duration for Fire personnel: 10:30am – 5pm

Seven dead, three shot and transported including one Police Officer and one civilian who ran to a residence 1 block away.

Later determined to be Domestic Terrorism / Hate Crime

## ACTIVE SHOOTER IN OAK CREEK - CONTINUED

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*active*). The big difference is the media attention and the legacy left by the Temple shooting versus the Comfort Suites. The response was more local in the Comfort Suites shooting and the lessons learned were in the back of our minds during the escalation of the Sikh event. One good thing was the availability of commercial/business parking across from both events and it was fully utilized; this may not be true for other localities. Early good staging can help in the long run. In both cases veteran command staff both from Oak Creek and Mutual Aid departments, made the events run smooth.

**Impact of MABAS.** Most definitely MABAS helped. It moved our local fire dispatching to the MABAS dispatcher (the Fire Department in Wauwatosa, as the Div 107 Dispatch Center) for getting the proper response out. Otherwise a lot of use of cell phone contributed to other needs and communication beyond the site. Internally we had no lapse in communications during the event. Even our other day to day calls were taken care of by our local dispatch without issue as personnel were ramped up with a BC in the dispatch center. We also had another Battalion Chief in charge of the city for all other events.

MABAS has been tested since the 2004 incident and has served us well in a planned organized response. From other events such as the Patrick Cudahy fire, We Energies Power Plant explosion, and We Energies Power Plant lakeside cliff landslide, to the Sikh event, the system works and resources are not exhausted for one particular municipality. We also have had a good working relationship with the City of Milwaukee (Div 109) over the years from the I-94 highway

reconstruction project to the landslide at the Power Plant. The Sikh Temple was no different. Everyone contributed. All the classes and meetings have paid off. Everyone bought their "A" game. Was it perfect, no; we are still working on it as well as the rest of the country. Growth will be a process each time it happens somewhere.

As for prior to 2004, we had worked with our neighboring mutual aid Milwaukee County Zone E communities (St. Francis, Cudahy, South Milwaukee, 440<sup>th</sup> USAF Reserve Airlift Wing and now the 128<sup>th</sup> National Guard Air Refueling Wing) since 1991 on many working stills (Full Assignments) in various types of calls. We can fill in at any



**Oak Creek FD TEMS member BC Joe Pulvermacher at Sikh incident.**

(Photo by Chuck Liedtke)

function, in any community without blinking an eye. Our neighbors have highly professional trained staff from all ranks.

Even as we have expanded our response to include more departments on our cards - Zone D (Franklin, Greendale, Greenfield, and Hales Corners), Division 102 (South Shore, Raymond, and Caledonia), and the remaining division 107 of Wauwatosa, West Allis, and North Shore into our response - it has been pretty seamless. We get the job done and go home.

**Active Shooter changes since 2004 incident.** Changes include an early established staging area and the creation of MABAS designated channels worked well. The transition from a mobile command into the field command post was a good transition and was utilized to its capacity in 2012 instead of the 2004 Comfort Suites incident, where Command was standing in the street too long.

The biggest change though was over 8 years of TEMS training that was a good addition that came to play a key role at the Sikh event.

One last point is our staff of firefighter paramedics has grown significantly where multiple units were utilized. So with the mutual aid paramedics' response, our paramedics, and a solid command presence, we had a high level of service from triage to transport and the debriefing occurred within one week after it happened.

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## MABAS DIVISION 112 IN ACTION - 3 ALARM FIRE IN A LARGE HOUSE BY DREW SPIELMAN

On March 27, 2013, a fire was reported at 2451 Brown County Highway ZZ in a 4,200 square foot home with an attached bi-level garage. The **Greanleaf Volunteer Fire Department** responded. The second alarm MABAS Box 9-32 was escalated to the 3rd alarm level for tenders only. The design of the house, along with a sloping landscape, presented 4 different views from sides A-B-C-D (nearly 4 stories from the front and one story in the rear).



**Above** - the four sides of the structure.

**Below** - LDH lead out from road into working engine was about 300'. Then laid was 100' up to the rear with a manifold. There were two engines pumping off road into fire scene.



(Photos by Drew Spielman. These photos and others are located at <http://secondalarmimages.smugmug.com> )

## ACTIVE SHOOTER IN BROOKFIELD BY CHARLIE MYERS, CHIEF, CITY OF BROOKFIELD FIRE DEPARTMENT

**Size up and response.** On Saturday, October 21, 2012 at 11:15 a.m., the City of Brookfield Fire Department was dispatched for an active shooter situation with multiple patients at Azana Spa, located at 200 N. Moorland Rd. across from the Brookfield Square Mall. The initial tone out was for Station 3 with an ambulance and paramedic unit, and for the Deputy Chief of Operations from Station 1. The Deputy Chief of Operations immediately upgraded the call for all on duty personnel to respond. This included a total of two engines, one quint and three paramedic units.

While en route, dispatch advised that there was one patient located at the Dousman Stagecoach Inn Museum, about a half mile north of Azana. Station 2 units were directed to that scene. Dispatch also advised that a patient was in McDonald's, which is

located next door to Azana. At this point, MABAS BOX 21-13 was activated to the box alarm level, bringing in three additional ambulances and an engine company, backfilling the stations with mutual aid crews and initiating a callback of off-duty personnel. Elm Grove EMS (an adjoining suburb) was monitoring the incident and dispatched two paramedics units directly to the scene.

Crews were able to safely approach McDonald's by driving southbound in the northbound lanes and then shield behind McDonald's. While at that location, police squads delivered three patients to waiting fire and EMS crews.

**Escalation.** While crews were treating the four injured patients, the Deputy Chief of Operations was monitoring the police radio traffic.

Police indicated that there were at least six people shot. Upon hearing this MABAS Box 21-13 was activated to the second alarm level, bringing in three more ambulances and another engine.

**Extraordinary aspects.** The shooter also started the building on fire. Fortunately the building has a sprinkler system, which extinguished the fire. However, this was not known to Command, so additional fire crews were called in for potential fire extinguishment. Also, there were reports that the shooter brought explosives into the building. Fire and EMS crews were separated into divisions. The fire division prepared for firefighting operations, while the EMS division prepared for a mass casualty incident.

**Across the street to the west is one of the largest shopping malls in the State.** Fire Command established the Mall parking lot as staging. A building in the parking lot was used to provide cover from the Azana Spa for personnel and apparatus. Bystanders that had assembled in the area prior to arrival were moved to a safe location.

The Mall provided us with an exceptional staging area away from the Police staging area. The Staging Officer developed a plan to stage like apparatus together and prepared them for deployment. Additionally, a fire suppression task force was assembled to handle the potential need for fire suppression. Because of the size of the mall parking lot we were able to land flight for Life in the staging area.

The Police Command assigned officers to protect the public in the

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### AZANA SPA ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENT

#### Scene:

Large 2-Story freestanding upscale Salon and Spa with many rooms  
 Located on a busy commercial north-south roadway  
 Next door to the north is an active Mc Donald's with a large parking lot  
 To the south and east is a busy Country Club with a golf course and tennis courts.  
 Across the street is a large shopping mall open for business (Brookfield Square)  
 Weather Conditions: Sunny Sunday morning (10/21/12) around 11am, 60 degrees

#### Summary:

Report of multiple people shot in the building  
 Report of smoke inside with sprinklers activated  
 Report of people hiding/trapped inside the building  
 Unknown location of shooter (car not on scene, thought to have escaped, but later found dead inside from self-inflicted gunshot)  
 Shooter possibly known to victims  
 Mall and nearby businesses heavily populated  
 Eventual discovery of possible explosive device inside building  
 Staging across the street in shopping mall parking lot  
 Duration: 11am – 5pm  
 Four dead, four shot and transported  
 Later determined to be Domestic Violence

## ACTIVE SHOOTER IN BROOKFIELD - CONTINUED

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Mall from exiting on EAST side which may have put them in the harm's way. They established a media location and staging areas for citizens that had friends or family members at the Spa.

**Communication.** Communications used for this incident started on the Waukesha County Communication (WCC) Dispatch A and City of Brookfield trunked tactical (TAC A). When the incident was upgraded to a MABAS event communications was moved to IFERN (patched Waukesha County 800 MHz trunked talkgroup to VHF IFERN), 8TACRED and 8TACWHITE following the MABAS communications model. Because fire moved off of the Waukesha County trunk radio system on to the simplex MABAS tactical channels, communications worked well. A Fire Liaison was assigned to the Police Command Post for face-to-face communications. Communication from the Fire Liaison to Fire Command was conducted on either 8TACRED or by cell phone.

**MABAS.** Policy and procedures worked very well during this event. This was a two County event. Resources from Waukesha and Milwaukee County communicated and worked exceptionally well. Units reported to staging. Tactical channels were assigned. Units were organized into a task force (fire division) and a strike team (EMS division). Throughout the event briefings were held to update responders on the information that was available and the operational plans for different scenarios that might occur.

Our MABAS partners are well trained in the use of communications to MABAS events. They limited their communications to the minimum

necessary and waited until they arrived at staging to receive their assignments and situation update.

Outside resources such as Waukesha County Rehab, Salvation Army, Fuddrucker's Restaurant, Jersey Mike's Restaurant and others provided assistance to the responders. We were mindful to share these resources with the Police to assist them.

**Training advice for others.** A couple of items that others might consider to prepare for large events:

1. I would highly recommend, attending the Homeland Security training offered by FEMA on domestic preparedness. It helps you prepare for large scale events.
2. Have a solid understanding and ability to use NIMS. You might not need to use all positions but you will need many of the functions.
3. You cannot run this size operation alone. Establish relationships with your mutual aid partners, delegate functions to your command staff and most

of all trust them to take care and complete their assignments.

4. Listen to your command staff and implement their suggestions.
5. Have a planning section, prepare for the next event and for demobilization.
6. Have a logistics section to handle the needs of the responders, food, water, restroom, etc.
7. Use checklists. Don't try to run this size of operation from your back pocket.

**Impact on future training.** After the event, the on-duty shift and staff officers got together to discuss it. As always, you learn many things that weren't known at the time. Future changes include:

1. We have increased our ability to treat victims of a mass casualty.
2. We updated our checklists.
3. We continue to improve our relationships with our mutual aid partners.

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**The Azana Spa shares a common driveway with McDonald's.**

*(Photo by Gary Schmidt)*

## ACTIVE SHOOTER IN BROOKFIELD - CONTINUED

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4. Work with our Police Department to develop casualty collection points, improve communications and information sharing. Work to share like resources for rehab, critical incident stress debriefing, communications and situational awareness.

### Comparison to Previous Incident.

(On March 12, 2005, a gunman opened fire inside the Sheraton hotel in Brookfield, killing 4 people and himself and shooting 7 others, 3 of which died at the hospital. The location was ½ mile to the south.) Documentation from 2005 indicates that City of Brookfield FD did have mutual aid box cards (but no MABAS yet) and the incident commander considered activating Card 500.

However, the IC "Specialed In" mutual aid ambulances from surrounding communities. For the 2012 incident:

- MABAS policy and procedures formalized the process and standardized the procedures.
- MABAS cards pre-designates which neighboring community assets will be activated.
- MABAS improved command and control and we have formalized the command structure.
- Improved communication through MABAS communications procedure and the use of IFERN and standardized simplex channels.

**Active Shooter changes since 2005 incident.** Once Police has the

scene controlled, Fire/EMS must be ready to establish triage, provide lifesaving care, and rapidly transport victims. MABAS implementation in the 2012 event pre-selected assets and pre-designated communication/staging details.

Situations like this re-emphasize the importance of rapid triage and transport to the regional trauma center. EMS personnel must limit on-scene time and rendered care during the transport.

We have improved coordination with Police to provide resources as needed and plan for such events to unfold. We have developed a strong relationship with the Police to support the operation that allows them to do their job.

## USING A LIFE SAFETY BOX FOR AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SCENARIO BY GARY SCHMIDT

For both the Oak Creek and the Brookfield active shooter incidents, a Life Safety MABAS box was used. There was no mention of an active shooter by the MABAS tone-out for either event, however, in each case, very specific staging information was provided.

The Life Safety box typically is used for a large accident where responders are trying to get to the scene as expeditious as possible, however, in these cases, extreme care was needed so as to not become part of the problem (in the crossfire). In both cases, there was also a fire or potential fire / explosive risk.

I asked each Chief if there are any thoughts for future responses to perhaps go with a Disaster Box for active shooter scenarios instead of a Life Safety Box to eliminate the subsequent need for a Structure Fire Box as having two boxes for the same incident invariably causes confusion.

**Chief Rosandich:** "It will depend on how information is received to get the tone out and which card will be used. But by all means when there is a combination of injuries and fire a disaster card makes sense. We did this at the Power Plant for an incident".

**Chief Myers:** "During this event the Deputy Chief of Operations gave specific instructions to WCC about how to approach the staging area to prevent putting personnel in the harm's way".

"You bring up a good point that MABAS Dispatchers should be trained to give the type of event for the Box Alarm and upgrade events. I hope MABAS WI would add this to the Communications Policy".

"Had the Deputy Chief of Operations known about the fire during the initial response I believe he would have requested a

Disaster Box. In this situation we started with a Life Safety Box. When information was received regarding the fire a Structure Fire Box at a higher level was requested. This was done to minimize the impact on mutual aid partners that were sending apparatus to the Life Safety Box".

"Information in these incidents is always difficult. I think the key is to be flexible. Stay calm and plan for the next event".

### How to Contact Us

Your contributions to the various columns will make this newsletter a success. Let us know about your MABAS response activity at [garyschmidt@wi.rr.com](mailto:garyschmidt@wi.rr.com). In particular, pictures of activity are needed.

# MABAS DIVISION 104 IN ACTION - TECHNICAL RESCUE MABAS BOX USED

BY LOREN LIPPINCOTT, CHIEF, MILTON AND TOWN OF MILTON FIRE DEPARTMENT

On Friday April 19, 2013, a 27-year-old worker at the United Ethanol plant in Milton, six miles northwest of Janesville in Rock County, became trapped in a grain engulfment at about 10:15am, according to the company's website. Sixteen fire departments and two law enforcement agencies totaling over 100 personnel worked for 13 hours to recover the victim.

With Rock County Division 104 bordering Illinois, for years the area has had a joint State Line Tech Rescue team which combines trained personnel from MABAS Divisions 17, 18, 30, 38, and 104. This was the first use of Milton's Technical Rescue Box card. The Technical Rescue cards of Division 104 were developed by the countywide MABAS committee several years ago and were influenced by the experiences of MABAS Illinois.

For this incident, the box was called for immediately. In the afternoon, an *interstate*, interdivisional request for the personnel and expertise of MABAS Division 8 in Illinois, was called for simply via an IFERN tone-out.

The size of the bin and the amount to corn were the challenges faced by responders, with safety being the priority.

**Use of MABAS.** The advantages to having MABAS are obvious - no one had to think about where to get the needed resources. Even though Milton has never used the Tech Rescue Box card before, no issues were encountered. MABAS worked as it should. It is a good resource and makes the operation go better. I hope that everyone in the State of Wisconsin would eventually join. It works. It is valuable. It makes incidents more manageable.



(Photos by Michael Gouvion/Milton Courier)



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For more information about becoming a member of MABAS-Wisconsin or to view all issues of this newsletter, visit: [www.mabaswisconsin.org](http://www.mabaswisconsin.org) (scroll down for newsletter links)



# MABAS – Wisconsin

## Mutual Aid Box Alarm System

Organized 2004


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- 101 – Kenosha County
- 102 – Racine County
- 103 – Walworth County
- 104 – Rock County
- 105 – Green County
- 106 – Waukesha County
- 107 – Milwaukee County
- 108 – Grant County
- 109 – Milwaukee City
- 110 – Portage County
- 111 – Washington County
- 112 – Brown County
- 113 – Sheboygan County
- 114 – Oneida County
- 115 – Dane County
- 116 – Wood County
- 117 – Dunn/Pepin County
- 118 – Jefferson County
- 119 – Ozaukee County
- 120 – Fond du Lac County
- 121 – Vilas County
- 122 – Calumet County
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- 141 – Green Lake County
- 142 – Waupaca County
- 143 – St. Croix County
- 144 – Marinette County
- 145 – Monroe County
- 146 – Florence County
- 147 – Langlade County

#### MABAS OPERATING FREQUENCIES

IFERN

IFERN2

MABAS1 (WISCOM)

MABAS2 (WISCOM)

MABAS Alerting / intra-Divisional responses

Alternate intra-Divisional responses

Inter-Divisional Responses

Contact with Wisconsin Red Center

Regional Coordinators - WEM Coordination\*

\*Future use